Case Summary: Damis Holdings Chapter 11

This report covers DAMIS Holdings LLC, the commercial, residential and industrial real-estate arm of the Shabsels brothers' DAMIS–SIMAD Enterprise. The summer camp side of the enterprise — led by the BVI parent, SIMAD Holdings, Ltd. — commenced its own, separately administered Chapter 11 cases. See our companion coverage of SIMAD Holdings HERE.

A deck version of this summary is also available HERE.

Business Description

Headquartered in Trumbull, CT, DAMIS Holdings LLC ("DAMIS Holdings"), together with its 89 affiliated debtors (collectively, the "DAMIS Debtors" or the "Company"), is the real-estate arm of the Shabsels brothers enterprise — a diversified portfolio of commercial, residential, and industrial property built up since DAMIS Holdings LLC’s 2009 formation around the firm’s stated strategy of acquiring undervalued assets and managing them actively.

The DAMIS Debtors are indirect subsidiaries of SIMAD Holdings, Ltd. (the "Parent Company", or "SIMAD"), a British Virgin Islands holding company, and are ultimately owned in equal 50% shares by brothers Michael and David Shabsels — together forming the DAMIS-SIMAD Enterprise. The SIMAD debtors own and operate approximately 30 summer camps and, while sharing common 50/50 ownership and a Trumbull headquarters with the DAMIS Debtors, run on separate Chief Restructuring Officers and separate counsel.

The Company owns, leases, and operates approximately 55 properties in 23 states — Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia — spanning across hotels and lodging, leisure, multifamily properties, retail properties, office buildings, medical offices, and industrial properties.

DAMIS Holdings and its affiliates filed for Chapter 11 protection on June 4, 2026 (the "Petition Date") in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey, reporting $100 million to $500 million in assets and $500 million to $1 billion in liabilities.

Corporate History

The Shabsels Brothers entered the for-profit summer-camp (SIMAD) business in 2006, acquiring camps and forming two entities for each — one to hold the land, one to run operations — while sometimes keeping the original owners on as partners. DAMIS Holdings LLC was formed in 2009 and the DAMIS enterprise operates with a similar paired-entity structure — a land-holding entity and an operating entity. Over roughly two decades the brothers rolled up a portfolio of approximately 80 real estate assets nationwide; the most recent phase of expansion was financed through the Parent Company's December 2025 secured bond offering on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.

Operations Overview

The DAMIS Debtors' business centers on the acquisition, operation, management, development, and leasing of income-generating commercial, residential, and industrial real estate and related assets.

Owned vs. Leased Properties

As of the Petition Date, the DAMIS Debtors hold a mix of outright-owned properties and ground-leased properties, though the Debtor Advisors cannot yet provide a reliable valuation — property values underpinning the various mortgages and other financial transactions remain under active investigation.

• Owned Properties — The DAMIS Debtors hold fee interests in 18 owned properties (the "Owned Properties") across 13 states — Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Virginia — acquired between 2016 and 2022 and spanning hotels, industrial properties, medical offices, multifamily apartment buildings, office buildings, retail properties, and mixed-use properties. Each Owned Property is encumbered by a mortgage (each, a "Fee Mortgage").
• Leased Properties — Fee simple interests in the Leased Properties are held by non-debtor entities (each, a "Non-Debtor Fee Holder") not controlled by the DAMIS Debtors, though many are owned — directly or indirectly — by the Shabsels Brothers, family trusts for their benefit, Leeton Real Estate, Inc. (controlled by longstanding business partner Mark Graham), or some combination thereof.

Leased Property Acquisition Mechanics

The Leased Properties were assembled through a standardized multi-step acquisition process that the CRO's Declaration illustrates with a hypothetical $10 million target property.

• Target Identification — The DAMIS Debtors would identify a target property generally comprising a mix of real property, buildings, improvements, mineral rights, timber rights, personalty, existing leases, and related assets.
• Non-Debtor Fee Holder Acquisition — The Non-Debtor Fee Holder would enter into a purchase contract with the third-party owner of the target property, paying $10 million to the third-party seller (the "Initial Acquisition"). The DAMIS Debtors were not party to this contract.
• Secondary Acquisitions to DAMIS Debtors — The Non-Debtor Fee Holder would then enter into separate sale agreements (the "Secondary Acquisitions") with two DAMIS Debtor entities: (i) a LandCo Debtor, contracting to purchase the ownership interests in the buildings, improvements, personalty, and other rights and interests associated with the target property, subject to a 99-year ground lease (each, a "Ground Lease"); and (ii) an OpCo Debtor, contracting to purchase the rights under all pre-existing tenant leases, space leases, and similar leases and interests connected to the target property, also subject to the Ground Lease. The aggregate amount the two DAMIS Debtor entities would pay to the Non-Debtor Fee Holder under these sale agreements — $8 million — was less than the $10 million the Non-Debtor Fee Holder had itself paid to the original third-party seller.
• Two Financing Legs Close Simultaneously — With the purchase and sale agreements in place, both closings occurred simultaneously so the combined proceeds could fund the full purchase price to the original seller. The DAMIS Debtors obtained acquisition financing secured by the assets to be acquired in the Secondary Acquisition (a "Leasehold Mortgage"), typically at a loan-to-value ratio of 65–75% of the purchase price — so between $5.2 million and $6 million — with the LandCo and OpCo Debtors as borrowers and other DAMIS Debtors, non-debtor affiliates, the Shabsels Brothers, or a combination thereof serving as guarantors or pledgors. Separately, the Non-Debtor Fee Holder obtained acquisition financing secured by the fee simple interest in the target property (a "Non-Debtor Fee Mortgage"), typically equal to 40% of the purchase price — so $4 million. The Non-Debtor Fee Mortgages did not constitute obligations of the DAMIS Debtors. When possible, the Non-Debtor Fee Mortgage would be provided by a traditional long-term mortgage lender; typically, however, it would be provided by a short-term bridge lender, with the goal of replacing the bridge loan with a permanent mortgage at some point after closing.
• Post-Closing Ownership and Cash Flow — After closing, the fee interest in the real property was owned by the Non-Debtor Fee Holder, the buildings and improvements were owned by the LandCo Debtor subject to the Ground Lease, and the leases with space tenants were owned by the OpCo Debtor, also subject to the Ground Lease. Rent receipts by the LandCo Debtor and/or the OpCo Debtor were used to service the Leasehold Mortgage, and ground rent received by the Non-Debtor Fee Holder from the LandCo Debtor and the OpCo Debtor under the Ground Lease was used to service the Non-Debtor Fee Mortgage.

CMBS Securitization

Three pools of Non-Debtor Fee Mortgages have been identified as having been refinanced into CMBS conduit trusts — based on an objection filed by the affected trustees, not a comprehensive disclosure by the Debtors. Additional pools may exist but have not yet appeared on the docket. Computershare Trust Company, N.A., and Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB (collectively, the "Leasehold Tenant Creditors") have appeared in the cases as fee-level creditors. Each pool is structured around a Borrower — a Non-Debtor Fee Holder — that owns the fee simple interest in the underlying properties and has entered into ground leases with Ground Tenants, most of whom are Chapter 11 debtors (the "Ground Tenant Debtors"). The three pools are:

• Shabsels Fee Leasehold Trust — A $23.5 million note dated March 6, 2023, securitized into BANK5 2023-5YR1 (Trustee: Computershare Trust Company, N.A.). The borrower is MIMOCT LLC (successor-in-interest to Milton Valley Center LLC), covering three sites — Valley Center (Michigan), Great Pond (Connecticut), and Clocktower (Missouri) — each with separate leasehold mortgagees at the site level.
• Leeton Trust — A $23.85 million note dated June 24, 2025, securitized into BBCMS Mortgage Trust 2025-C35 (Trustee: Computershare Trust Company, N.A.). The borrowers are Three Property Holdings of Quad Cities LLC (Iowa) and Integrated Eastchase Holdings LLC (Texas), covering sites in Bettendorf/Davenport/Rock Island (Iowa/Illinois), Fort Worth (Texas), and Indianapolis (Indiana).
• Leeton Leased Fee Pool C Trust — A $34.4 million note dated April 14, 2026, securitized into Benchmark 2026-B43 (Trustee: Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB). The borrowers are Milton 90 Pleasant Valley Street LLC (Massachusetts), Development Associates of Benton Harbor LLC (Michigan), and Windsong Equity Holdings LLC (Indiana), covering The Loop (Massachusetts) and Fairplain (Michigan) sites.

The three pools together represent approximately $81.75 million of fee-level debt sitting outside the DAMIS estate. The Leasehold Tenant Creditors hold mortgages and assignments of leases and rents against the Borrowers, giving them an interest in or claim against each corresponding Ground Tenant Debtor. Each Ground Tenant Debtor is additionally party to a leasehold mortgage held by a separate Leasehold Mortgagee, meaning each Ground Tenant Debtor carries at least three major creditors — the Leasehold Mortgagee, the Leasehold Tenant Creditor, and the fee-level CMBS trust. The Leasehold Tenant Creditors object to the Debtors' motion to file a consolidated top-30 creditor list on the grounds that such a list would omit key creditors of individual Ground Tenant Debtors, and separately assert that no inference of substantive consolidation should be drawn from any relief granted on the motion.

Workforce

The DAMIS Debtors directly employ approximately 744 individuals, who serve in corporate functions — legal, operations management, accounting, and treasury — alongside building-engineering, maintenance, hospitality, resort/water-park, and apartment-site staff. Many on-site workers are engaged through third-party management companies — including CBRE, Inc., InSite Realty Partners, LP, and Simpson Properties, Inc. serving as employer of record.

Prepetition Obligations

Below is a summary of the Debtor's prepetition obligations as of the Petition Date. Note that the capital structure figures are preliminary and subject to revision, according to the First Day Declaration. The DAMIS Debtors have not yet filed their schedules of assets and liabilities, which are expected to be filed in the coming months and will contain the full indebtedness disclosure. The CRO's characterization of any party as "secured" is for descriptive convenience only and does not constitute an admission as to the validity, existence, or extent of any lien or security interest against the estates. For additional details on the prepetition capital structure, refer to the First Day Declaration and the Cash Collateral Motion.

• Mortgage Obligations ($466 million) - The DAMIS Debtors' prepetition secured indebtedness under the Fee Mortgages and Leasehold Mortgages totals approximately $466 million in aggregate principal outstanding (the "Mortgage Obligations"), owed to various lenders. The Debtor Advisors are continuing to review title reports for each Property to confirm the current holders and servicers of all Mortgages and identify any additional recorded liens against the Properties and associated assets.
• Small Business Administration Loans ($1.1 million) - Fourteen DAMIS Debtors obtained Economic Injury Disaster Loans (the "EIDL Loans") through the U.S. Small Business Administration following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, with individual loan amounts ranging from approximately $35,000 to $180,000, 30-year maturities, and secured by each borrower's tangible and intangible personal property. Approximately $1.1 million in EIDL Loan obligations remained outstanding as of the Petition Date.
• Merchant Cash Advance ($134 million) - Certain DAMIS Debtors are party to merchant cash advance arrangements (the "MCAs") — short-term, revenue-based financing in which MCA Lenders advance working capital in exchange for contractually determined percentages of specific DAMIS Debtors' receivables, acquired at a significant discount. Recovery is effected through periodic, automatic withdrawals from the DAMIS Debtors' bank accounts until the MCA Obligations are repaid in full. MCA Agreements vary in form and substance, but typically purport to pledge a security interest in future accounts, receivables, receipts, or revenue streams — or sometimes in all assets of the borrower — which security interest is often conditional in nature: granted only upon a payment default, or, if granted upon signing, authorizing the MCA Lender to file a UCC-1 only upon the occurrence of a default. The MCA Obligations are broadly guaranteed across the enterprise — by DAMIS Debtor entities, SIMAD Debtor entities, non-debtor affiliates, and the Shabsels Brothers personally. Approximately $134 million in MCA Obligations remained outstanding as of the Petition Date.
• General Unsecured Obligations ($52 million) - As of the Petition Date, the DAMIS Debtors estimate approximately $52 million in outstanding unsecured obligations consisting primarily of trade payables and individual unsecured loans, many of which are personally guaranteed by the Shabsels Brothers. The figure remains an estimate pending the preparation of the Debtors' schedules of assets and liabilities and statements of financial affairs.

Events Leading to Bankruptcy

The Chapter 11 filings were precipitated by a default under the SIMAD Debtors' publicly held bond issuance (the "SIMAD Debentures") following a missed interest payment on May 31, 2026. Recognizing that they could not satisfy their funded-debt obligations without court protection, the SIMAD Debtors and the DAMIS Debtors commenced their Chapter 11 cases on June 4, 2026.

The Parent-Level Trigger

Reviewing its first-quarter financials in late May 2026, parent SIMAD Holdings, Ltd. disclosed to the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange that nearly $34 million (approximately NIS 100 million) had been transferred — reportedly without board approval, and which the company characterized as inadvertent — to corporations controlled by the Shabsels Brothers. The audit committee demanded the full sum back, with interest, within one day; the brothers initially agreed, then the next day said they could not repay.

Because the funds were not returned, SIMAD Holdings Ltd. missed the first interest payment on its Series A debentures, due May 31, 2026 — only about six months after the raise. The disclosure was compounded by revelations that the brothers owed roughly $100 million in personal loans, certain of them secured “on the assets and cash flows of the company’s subsidiaries” — raising concern that collateral may have been pledged twice.

Liquidity Crisis and Cross Default Risk

The DAMIS Debtors entered bankruptcy in acute liquidity distress. As of the Petition Date, cash on hand had fallen far below the levels needed to service Mortgage Obligations, fund payroll, and cover operating expenses — and as of the date of the Declaration, only approximately $10.3 million in cash remained, proving insufficient to meet those obligations.

Compounding the liquidity crisis, certain Mortgage Loan Documents and MCA Agreements contain cross-guaranty and cross-default provisions that, if triggered by the SIMAD Debtors' bond default, MCA defaults, or the Shabsels Brothers' own bankruptcy filings, could have allowed Mortgage Lenders and MCA Lenders to exercise remedies against the DAMIS Debtors outside of bankruptcy. In the days immediately preceding the Petition Date, certain DAMIS Debtors had already defaulted on their MCA Obligations, and several MCA Lenders had begun sweeping cash from the DAMIS Debtors' bank accounts to recover amounts owed.

Chapter 11 Filing

The DAMIS cases were filed free-fall — no prepetition restructuring, no plan support agreement, no contingency planning. What followed is best read as four overlapping fights: control of the company, control of its cash, the validity of the $134 million MCA book, and the estate's litigation claims.

Governance and Professionals

The CRO stripped the Shabsels Brothers of all decision-making authority over the DAMIS Debtors on the Petition Date. Unable to obtain their signatures to relinquish bank-account signatory authority — a standoff still unresolved at the first-day stage — the Debtors sought court authority through the Cash Management Motion to direct the banks to install Perry Mandarino as sole signatory on all 95 Bank Accounts. Two disinterested directors, Bernard Katz (CohnReznick) and Jill Frizzley (ex-Weil lawyer), were seated immediately pre-filing to replace the brothers in all governance matters. Looking ahead, the Debtors intend to engage an independent forensic accountant focused expressly on prepetition intercompany transactions and a real estate consultant to deliver independent property appraisals across the portfolio.

The Contested Cash-Collateral Fight

With roughly $10.3 million in cash on hand — substantially all of which may constitute collateral for one or more prepetition lenders — the Debtors cannot spend a dollar without court authority under §363(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. The cash collateral process here is unusually granular: rather than a single omnibus order, the Debtors sought a standalone interim order for DAMIS Holdings and a separate order for each other secured party, with cash usage contained within the applicable LandCo/OpCo silo. The Debtors pursued consent wherever possible but made clear they would proceed on a contested basis against any lender who refused — a posture that accurately reflects a creditor body ranging from cooperative mortgage lenders to actively hostile MCA funders already sweeping accounts.

• The Debtors report they are unaware of any deposit-account control agreement with any secured party — the device Article 9 requires to perfect a non-possessory lien on a deposit account — leaving any secured party that is not itself the depository bank with a difficult path to establishing a perfected, non-avoidable interest in the Debtors' cash. The exposure compounds for MCA lenders: any security interest that attached or was perfected within 90 days of the Petition Date sits squarely within the preference window under §547 and may be avoidable regardless of perfection.
• For any lender that does clear the perfection hurdle, the Debtors have a second line of defense: no cash payments are owed unless the lender can show its collateral is actually losing value. Leasehold Mortgages were originated at 65–75% LTV, implying a built-in equity cushion of 25–35% — comfortably above the ~20% threshold courts generally treat as sufficient adequate protection. The Debtors concede that independent appraisals are not yet complete, but argue the cushion presumptively exists until proven otherwise.
• First Financial Bank — holding seven leasehold mortgage loans totaling approximately $89.5 million in original principal across seven properties — objects to the Debtors' proposed cash collateral use on multiple grounds. FFB's core argument is that its prepetition security interest in rents rides through the filing automatically under §552(b)(2), rendering the Debtors' proffered replacement liens on those same post-petition rents illusory — FFB cannot be given as adequate protection a lien it already holds, a position supported by Third Circuit authority. Beyond the replacement lien deficiency, FFB demands property-level line-item budgets with prior approval rights, segregation of rents by property with no commingling or intercompany transfers, and an explicit bar on using its collateral to pay junior creditors — specifically calling out the MCA funders by name. FFB does not consent to the Motion as proposed but signals willingness to negotiate toward a consensual cash collateral arrangement on those terms.
• TriState Capital Bank — administrative agent on the $28 million Big Flats Shopping Center loan — moved affirmatively to prohibit any use of its cash collateral and compel a full accounting of all amounts disbursed since the Petition Date. TriState's filing flags "questionable" prepetition wire transfers out of the 830 County Road Debtors' accounts to a DAMIS Debtor, including a $421,000 transfer made three days before the Petition Date, and raises the non-arm's length relationship between the Shabsels Brothers and Mark Graham — the ground lessor's principal and a longstanding business partner — as further grounds for court intervention.
• Visions Federal Credit Union — holding an $18.65 million first-lien leasehold mortgage and perfected security interest in all cash derived from the Rocking Horse Ranch — consented to a narrow, one-week use of its cash collateral solely to cover Rocking Horse payroll obligations due the week of June 22, 2026, capped at $241,500, while expressly reserving all rights and remedies with respect to any further or expanded use.
• NBT Bank, National Association — holding a first-lien leasehold mortgage and perfected security interest in all cash derived from the SplashDown Beach Water Park — similarly consented to a narrow, one-week use of its cash collateral solely to cover SplashDown payroll obligations due the week of June 22, 2026, capped at $134,500, while expressly reserving all rights and remedies with respect to any further or expanded use.

The MCA Stay-Enforcement War

The most aggressive postpetition conduct came from the MCA funders, who continued sweeping accounts and redirecting tenant rent in open defiance of the automatic stay. Days into the case, the Stony Creek (operates 1000 Acres Ranch) funder — believed to be Bloc Funding — swept the 1000 Acres Ranch operating account at TD Bank to a negative balance just as the property entered peak season. The signal violation came June 12, when The Merchant Marketplace Holdings ("MMH"), through Houston counsel Regent & Associates, served a UCC §9-406 demand directly on The TJX Companies — a major retail tenant — asserting that the Debtors' accounts "now belong to" MMH and directing TJX to remit rent on an asserted $637,811.99 debt straight to MMH rather than to the Debtors.

The Debtors responded on multiple fronts: notifying all MCA lenders in writing that such conduct violates the automatic stay, and deploying Kroll to notify over 300 tenants that rent remains payable solely to the Debtors. As certain MCA funders persisted in sweeping the Debtors' bank accounts and contacting tenants to redirect rent payments in violation of the stay, the Debtors escalated to court, filing a motion to formally restate and enforce the automatic stay, labeling the non-compliant lenders "Violating Lenders" on the record, singling out MMH by name, and expressly reserving the right to pursue sanctions and clawback of all improperly swept funds.

Key Issues

• Fraudulent Transfer — The ~$34 million allegedly moved without board approval to Shabsels-controlled entities is a parent-level disclosure — originating from SIMAD Holdings, Ltd. at the BVI level and surfaced in Tel Aviv bond filings — not an allegation in the DAMIS pleadings themselves. It reaches the DAMIS estate only to the extent DAMIS funds were among those transferred, or through a successful substantive consolidation argument. Note that these are allegations and company/press disclosures, not adjudicated findings; the Shabsels Brothers have not been criminally charged.
• Insider / Preference — TriState flags a $421,000 prepetition wire and characterizes broader account activity as "millions of dollars of suspicious transfers" — allegations that, layered on top of the Debtors' own perfection attack on the MCA lien stack, create meaningful preference and avoidance exposure across multiple creditor relationships.
• Non-Arm's-Length Ground Leases. Across the Leased Properties portfolio, fee simple interests are held by Non-Debtor Fee Holders — entities owned directly or indirectly by the Shabsels Brothers, family trusts for their benefit, or Leeton Real Estate, Inc., controlled by Mark Graham, a longstanding Shabsels business partner who TriState advises has also personally provided legal representation to the brothers. This structure is not incidental — it is how the entire portfolio was assembled. At the Big Flats Shopping Center specifically, a retail property in Chemung County, New York operated by debtor 830 County Road 64 Real Estate LLC and debtor 830 County Road 64 Leasing LLC under a 99-year ground lease, TriState became the first creditor to flag the conflict as a live litigation concern, alleging that the fee owner and ground landlord, Elmira Real Estate Enterprises LLC — managed by Graham's Leeton Real Estate — is not at arm's length with the Debtors. The concern runs across the portfolio: the DAMIS Debtors pay ground rent up to Non-Debtor Fee Holders, which is supposed to flow through to service the fee-level debt on the underlying land. Where the fee holder is a Shabsels or Graham affiliate, questions arise as to whether ground leases were negotiated at arm's length, whether ground rent is being properly applied to fee-level lenders, and whether funds are being diverted — risks that leasehold mortgagees across the portfolio have an interest in scrutinizing.
• Breach of Fiduciary Duty / D&O Claims. The Shabsels Brothers, as the ultimate controllers of the DAMIS-SIMAD enterprise, face potential breach of fiduciary duty exposure for authorizing or permitting the prepetition transaction structure — including the intercompany transfers under active investigation and the layered mortgage architecture that left the same rent stream servicing multiple tiers of debt simultaneously. The threshold question, however, is not liability but collectability: with both brothers having filed personal bankruptcy, their individual estates are not the practical recovery source. The D&O insurance tower — to the extent one exists and covers the relevant conduct — is likely where any meaningful recovery would need to come from.
• Veil-Piercing / Substantive Consolidation. The pervasive cross-guaranty web spanning DAMIS Debtors, SIMAD Debtors, non-debtor affiliates, and the Shabsels Brothers personally — combined with the centralized cash management structure running through DAMIS Holdings — provides a factual foundation that creditors may seek to develop into alter-ego or substantive consolidation theories. The argument could run in either direction: some creditors may seek to pool assets across the DAMIS and SIMAD estates to maximize recoveries, while the CMBS trustees and leasehold mortgagees will resist any such pooling to preserve entity-level separateness. The CMBS trustees have already staked out an explicit anti-consolidation position, asserting that each Ground Tenant Debtor is a separate entity and offering documentary proof to that effect.

The DAMIS–SIMAD Entanglement

Whether the two estates can reach one another's value — the substantive-consolidation question — is among the most consequential issues for recoveries, and the record cuts both ways.

• Toward Entanglement. Three sets of facts support a consolidation argument. First, shared debt: Metropolitan Partners Group's $50 million May 2025 loan named both SIMAD Holdings LLC and DAMIS Holdings LLC as co-borrowers, and the U.S. SIMAD Holdings LLC — distinct from the BVI parent — appears as co-obligor or pledgor on multiple DAMIS mortgage facilities, including Bank Iowa, Fidelity, MAX Credit Union, and Visions. Second, shared guarantees: Visions' $18.65 million Rocking Horse loan is jointly guaranteed by both brothers and both holdcos. Third, shared incentives: Metropolitan, holding ~$25.4 million outstanding against both estates, and SIMAD's ~$214 million bondholders both stand to benefit from pooling — Metropolitan because it has claims on both sides, the bondholders because any shortfall in camp-portfolio recovery would create pressure to reach DAMIS real-estate equity. These are the parties most likely to press a consolidation argument as the cases develop.
• Toward separateness. The estates are separately administered with distinct CROs, separate counsel, and different lead cases. The SIMAD Debtors have affirmatively represented that their cash will not flow to DAMIS Holdings LLC or any of the DAMIS affiliates (SIMAD Doc. 57 ¶11). The DAMIS cash structure is largely siloed within each LandCo/OpCo pairing, with intercompany flows tracked as journal entries rather than actual cash transfers. Creditors themselves are pushing separateness — TriState demands property-level cash segregation, and the CMBS trustees have already objected to any inference of consolidation, asserting each Ground Tenant Debtor is a separate entity and offering documentary proof.

Explore Bondoro Insights for live case dockets and comprehensive coverage of material filings from petition to plan confirmation.

Stay informed on every Chapter 11 bankruptcy case with liabilities exceeding $10 million. Subscribe for free to have our coverage delivered directly to your inbox, and explore our full archive of past summaries.

Subscribers can also opt in to timely filing alerts by updating their email preferences in Account Settings.